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ARTICLE

EXPLANATION < JUSTIFICATION: GDPR AND THE PERILS
OF PRIVACY
T ALIA B. GILLIS AND JOSH SIMONS †
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
is the most comprehensive legislation yet enacted to govern algorithmic
decision-making. Its reception has been dominated by a debate about
whether it contains an individual right to an explanation of algorithmic
decision-making. We argue that this debate is misguided in both the
concepts it invokes and in its broader vision of accountability in modern
democracies. It is justification that should guide approaches to governing
algorithmic decision-making, not simply explanation. The form of
justification – who is justifying what to whom – should determine the
appropriate form of explanation. This suggests a sharper focus on
systemic accountability, rather than technical explanations of models to
isolated, rights-bearing individuals. We argue that the debate about the
governance of algorithmic decision-making is hampered by its excessive
focus on privacy. Moving beyond the privacy frame allows us to focus on
institutions rather than individuals and on decision-making systems rather
than the inner workings of algorithms. Future regulatory provisions
should develop mechanisms within modern democracies to secure
systemic accountability over time in the governance of algorithmic
decision-making systems.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
is the most comprehensive legislation yet enacted to govern algorithmic
decision-making. Its scope is supra-national, shaping the data protection
practices of companies operating throughout the world’s most
prosperous integrated economic area. It establishes enforcement
mechanisms with bite, threatening companies with fines of up to 4
percent of global turnover for the most serious violations. Yet the
GDPR’s focus is not decision-making, but privacy. This is the product
of history. The primary protagonists of current debates about governing
algorithmic decision-making are privacy scholars. We believe this
privacy lens has distorted interpretations of the GDPR’s approach to
governing algorithmic decision-making. That approach reaches beyond
an individual right to explanation, to establish provisions that aim to
build systemic accountability over time.
This paper examines those provisions. We explore the tools the
GDPR provides for ensuring that institutions justify their use of
algorithmic decision-making systems, to both regulators and individuals
subject to their decisions. Our aim is not simply to interpret the GDPR,
though we side with scholars who argue that the main text of the GDPR
must be read in conjunction with surrounding ‘soft-law’, including the
Recitals, Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) guidance, and the
interpretations of authorities mandated with enforcing its provisions. 1
Rather, our aim is to step back and examine the concepts that underpin
the right to explanation debate, and the broader challenge of regulating
algorithmic decision-making. We make three arguments.

1
See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons From the GDPR's Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), at 48; Margot E. Kaminski,
The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 197-199 (2019); Bryan
Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s ‘Right to Explanation’ Debate and
the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143 (2019).
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First, we argue that accountability is the foundational goal that
should guide approaches to governing algorithmic decision-making.
Accountability is achieved when an institution must justify its choices
about how it developed and implemented its decision-making
procedure, including the use of statistical techniques or machine
learning, to an individual or institution with meaningful powers of
oversight and enforcement. Accountability produces instrumental
benefits, including encouraging the use of decision-making procedures
that are consistent and verifiable, and providing mechanisms for
identifying and addressing discrimination and injustice. 2 However, we
argue that accountability is the foundational goal because of its intrinsic,
rather than its instrumental value. Accountability is constitutive of
democratic self-governance. It is part of what it means for a citizenry to
authorize in an ongoing way the complex decision-making systems
whose recommendations shape their lives. Other goals discussed in the
literature are all in some way means to securing accountability.
Individual explanations of algorithmic systems are valuable if and when
they enable institutions to justify those systems to individuals and
regulators, but they may not always further this end. 3 Transparency may
be necessary for some forms of accountability, but neither constitutes
nor is entirely sufficient for accountability. 4 In other words,
accountability requires justification and justification requires
explanation. The form of each should determine the form of the others.
Second, we distinguish between different forms of justification
required to attain systemic accountability and consider the appropriate
form of explanation in each. Recent scholarship has debated whether a
right to an explanation exists in the GDPR, and if so, what its content
might be. We argue that the form this explanation should take must
depend on the form of accountability being pursued. By separating out
different forms of justification, we set out how a ‘right to explanation’
(a “RtE”) might further the aim of accountability, and how it might
2
Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 26 (NYU Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-13, Apr. 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2410812; MATTHEW V. FLINDERS, THE POLITICS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Aldershot: Ashgate 2001); ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
SUSAN CAROL STOKES, AND BERNARD MANIN, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
3
See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018).
4
See generally Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing without Knowing: Limitations of
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA &
SOC'Y 973 (2016); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530
(2013).
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hinder it. We argue that the technical explanation of a statistical or
machine learning model is not sufficient for an institution to justify its
decision-making procedure. Furthermore, we argue that such a technical
explanation may even distract from the most important provisions of the
GDPR for securing systemic accountability. 5 These include two crucial
components. First, a range of mechanisms for ensuring that institutions
justify their choices in the design and implementation of algorithmic
decision-making systems – the critical ex ante stage in machine learning
– including their broader policy and commercial aims. Second, that
these mechanisms ensure justifications are offered to regulators with the
necessary information, resources and powers, not simply isolated,
rights-bearing individuals with limited information and expertise.
Third, we argue that the GDPR’s focus on privacy underpins some
of its most significant limits. We identify three such limits, some of
which are about the law itself, others about recent interpretations of the
law. First, recent interpretations of the law mistakenly focus on the
actual algorithms and machine learning models, rather than the broader
policy and commercial environment in which they are deployed. The
aims an institution has in designing and implementing an algorithmic
decision-making system shape the workings of the algorithm or model
itself, but receive far less attention, at least in the interpretive literature.
Second, the law itself is constrained by its focus on individual rights.
Machine learning, the most common form of algorithmic decisionmaking, makes information about the design and implementation about
the overall system critical to exercising meaningful oversight.
Information about individual decisions will not enable individuals to
grasp of the nature of the system whose decisions shape their lives, or
enhance their capacity to demand a justification from the powerful
institutions that designed it. For related reasons, the notice and consent
framework is not an adequate mechanism by which to ensure
meaningful institutional accountability. Third, the GDPR and the
literature surrounding it have no satisfactory account of how its
provisions are to be subject to democratic oversight. Accountability
matters because it is constitutive of democratic self-government. Future
regulatory provisions must focus more directly on developing
mechanisms within modern democracies that can secure accountability
in the governance of algorithmic decision-making systems.
5
See, e.g., Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19,
65-67 (2017); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a "Right to an
Explanation" to a "Right to Better Decisions"?, 16 IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 46, 50 (2018).
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The paper proceeds in two sections. The first contains our conceptual
argument. We begin by arguing that accountability is the foundational
goal that should guide approaches to governing algorithmic decisionmaking. Explanations are instrumentally valuable insofar as they enable
the process of giving and receiving justifications that constitutes
accountability in a democracy. The second draws out the implications
of this argument for interpreting the GDPR and for approaches to
governing algorithmic decision-making more broadly. We focus
specifically on machine learning in this paper. Though we are interested
more broadly in governance approaches to algorithmic decisionmaking, focusing specifically on machine learning draws attention to
the most acute practical and theoretical challenges. We focus our
discussion on governing the use of machine learning in the private rather
than the public sector.
We end by setting out some of the ways in which the limits to recent
interpretations of the GDPR are related to their framing in terms of
privacy. The challenges we face when developing governance systems
for algorithmic decision-making go beyond concerns that can usefully
be understood in terms of privacy.
I. EXPLANATION  JUSTIFICATION  ACCOUNTABILITY
This section outlines our conceptual argument. First, we argue that
accountability is the foundational goal. It should guide our
interpretations of the GDPR. It should also drive the questions we pose,
and the answers we advance, as we confront the broader task of
developing a comprehensive approach to governing algorithmic
decision-making. Second, we consider the implications this has for the
other concepts invoked in the debate about whether a right to
explanation exists in the GDPR (hereafter the RtE debate). The most
obvious is explanation itself, providing explanations of the logic of a
machine learning model to ensure that its operation is, in some way,
comprehensible to external human observers. Explanations are said to
be valuable because there is something inherently important about
individuals understanding the systems to which they are subject, that is,
because they respect individual autonomy; and also because such
understanding is instrumentally important, for individuals to challenge
decisions or to identify bias and discrimination. 6 We argue that
6
See Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated
Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT'L DATA PRIV. L. 243,
250 (2017); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 40-46.
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explanations of machine learning models are valuable if and when they
are a means to provide justifications of the broader decision-making
procedure. What matters is justifying why the rules are the way they are;
explaining what the rules are must further this end.
The focus on individual, technical explanations has been driven by
an uncritical bent towards transparency. Transparency is thought to
matter because to see is to know, and knowledge is power. Transparency
provides the information required for governance and oversight. 7 This
is a mistake. Like explanation, transparency is an instrumental good.
Transparency matters if and when it is required to further the aim of
systemic accountability. These concepts are important not only for the
RtE debate, but for thinking more broadly about the central aims that
should guide any approach to governing algorithmic decision-making.
This section aims to make progress towards such conceptual clarity.
A. Accountability
Accountability, we submit, is the foundational concept. It is the
motivation that drives arguments for transparency and for various forms
of explanation in machine learning. It should be the central aim of all
approaches to governing decision-making using machine learning. It is
therefore important to be clear about what accountability is and why it is
valuable.
Accountability is about vertical power. Accountability empowers those
who might otherwise be powerless, demanding that those who wield
power over them offer an account of their conduct. In the modern world,
its most familiar form is democratic accountability, in which those who
control the apparatus of well-organized territorial states must offer an
account of their conduct to citizens subject to their power. Democratic
accountability, as Jeremy Waldron puts it, confers “authority on those who
are otherwise powerless over those who are well endowed with power.” 8
More generally, accountability can be said to pertain in the following
structure. Party A is accountable to party B with respect to its conduct C,
if A has an obligation to provide B with some justification for C, and may
face some form of sanction if B finds A’s justification to be inadequate. 9
7
See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 4, at 974-977; Zarsky, supra note 4, at 1533; See
generally, DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).
8
See Waldron, supra note 2.
9
See Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 543,
544 (2018); see generally MARK BOVENS ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014).
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This is the principal-agent of accountability. 10 Accountability requires
an agent, such as rulers, to justify their conduct to a principal, such as an
electorate, subject to sanction through a range of mechanisms, most
obviously, elections. The agent’s exercise of power is shaped by the
knowledge of the principal’s inevitable judgement. Accountability ensures
that those with power must justify their decisions to those who they will
affect. Much like the threat of punishment, the idea is that this will change
the behaviour of those decision-makers for the better. 11 To apply this view
of accountability to decision-making procedures that use machine
learning, let us suppose accountability pertains when: An institution (Party
A) must justify its choices about how it developed and implemented its
decision-making procedure (Conduct C), including the use of statistical
techniques or machine learning, to an individual or institution with
meaningful powers of oversight and enforcement (Party B).
Accountability can secure a range of instrumental benefits. It
encourages institutions to use decision-making procedures that are
consistent and verifiable, as consistency and verifiability tend to make for
more persuasive justifications. It encourages institutions to identify
discrimination in their decision-making procedures, and where possible,
to address it in the design stage. 12 Structures of accountability can
incentivize institutions to develop decision-making procedures with more
care, consider a broad range of interests and perspectives, and evaluate
more kinds of risk and possible harms. 13
But accountability is about more than power. Part of the value of
accountability is that it changes the conduct of those with power because
they know that conduct will have to be justified. However, the more
fundamental value of accountability is intrinsic. It is constitutive of
democratic self-governance. 14 A king might fear the judgement of his
10
This has been the dominant view of accountability explored in political science and
political economy for the past two decades. See generally PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 2;
James D. Fearon, Self-Enforcing Democracy, 126 Q.J. ECON. 1661 (2011); FLINDERS, supra
note 2; KAARE STRØM, WOLFGANG C. MÜLLER, AND TORBJÖRN BERGMAN, DELEGATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES (2003).
11
ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2001).
12
Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 42, 55.
13
See Binns, supra note 9, at 547; Zarsky, supra note 4, at 1530-1550.
14
This is part of Jeremy Waldron’s argument, drawing on several recent critiques of the
narrowness of the principal-agent approach to accountability, and considering its relationship to
democracy more broadly. Waldron, supra note 2. See also JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL ORDER, AND CHANGE: EXPLORING ACCOUNTABILITY
PROCESSES IN AN ERA OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION (2017); CRAIG T. BOROWIAK,
ACCOUNTABILITY & DEMOCRACY: THE PITFALLS AND PROMISE OF POPULAR CONTROL
(2011); Alexander H. Trechsel, Reflexive Accountability and Direct Democracy, 33 W. EUR.
POL. 1050 (2010).
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subjects. He might fear rebellion or resistance. The anticipation of that
rebellion or resistance might shape the decisions he makes. But this is not
accountability. The King need not justify his decisions; he has no
obligation to offer an account of the decisions he has made, or his reasons
for making them, to his subjects. Whereas in a democracy, as Waldron
argues, “the accountable agents of the people owe the people an account
of what they have been doing, and a refusal to provide this is simple
insolence.” 15
Accountability is part of the practice of modern democracy. The giving
and receiving of justifications is part of what it means to jointly govern
ourselves. The agents who give and receive justifications are varied:
sometimes individual citizens justify what they do or decide to other
individual citizens, sometimes institutions justify what they do or decide
to individual citizens, sometimes institutions justify what they do or decide
to other institutions. 16 The content of their justifications might be varied
too, including important decision-making processes and procedures that
shape the lives of citizens. This broader view of accountability extends
beyond the public realm. The most obvious form of accountability in a
democracy is certainly the justification by public bodies of their conduct
to citizens. But the rules and procedures that shape our collective future
go far beyond those authored in the public realm. We expect companies
who deliver important services to justify their decisions and procedures,
to us as citizens, and to governments as our representatives. Facebook
must justify how it moderates content to Congress. 17 Its content
moderation system profoundly shapes how we interact as citizens;
decisions about how that system works are of public concern; therefore,
Facebook must justify those decisions to us, the public, or to our
representatives.
Democracy and accountability are not, however, the same thing. 18
There may actually be important tensions between democracy and
accountability. Mechanisms for accountability are often solutions to the
problem of control – they need not, and often are not, democratic. Central
banks and financial regulators are institutions of accountability, that is,
Waldron, supra note 2, at 28.
We side with Waldron on this point: whether the justification is offered or received by an
individual, a multitude, or a legal corporation doesn’t matter as much as some suppose. Id.
17
See Kate Klonick, Facebook Released Its Content Moderation Rules. Now What?, N.Y.
TIMES (April 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/opinion/facebook-contentmoderation-rules.html.
18
Mechanisms of accountability may actually change how we do democracy. If
accountability changes democracy, the two cannot be synonymous. See generally OLSEN, supra
note 14; Trechsel, supra note 14.
15
16
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they solve the problem of control, but they are not democratic.
Environmental regulators are institutions of accountability, but they are
not democratic. As Borowiak puts it, “accountability institutions can
create veils of legitimacy that mask abuses and dampen the critical and
participatory energies of the public. So doing, they can end up thwarting
citizen control rather than enhancing it.” 19 These are important issues, but
we want to put them aside. The challenge of ensuring that institutions of
accountability do not erode the possibilities of democratic action and
legitimacy is critical to the future of democracy in increasingly complex
societies and economies, but it is a separate challenge to thinking
systematically about accountability and what is required to achieve it.
Accountability, then, is the foundational concept. What follows, we
believe, is that transparency must be put in its proper place. Transparency
is valuable insofar as it furthers the aim of accountability. 20 The conditions
in which transparency furthers this aim are more limited than it is often
supposed. Demands for transparency tend to assume that if people are
provided with the necessary information, they will take action against
decisions they think are wrong. The GDPR, for example, requires
individuals to be provided with “meaningful information about the logic
involved” in the automated decision21 as part of the right to contest these
decisions 22 and to enforce other rights under the GDPR. 23
There are good reasons to be deeply skeptical about the connection
between the provision of information to individuals and those individuals
taking desired actions. Firstly, people have to understand the information
they receive. There is ample evidence that people struggle with even
simple and straightforward disclosures, 24 let alone disclosure that pertains
to more technical aspects of automated decision-making. Second, people
See BOROWIAK, supra note 14, at 179.
See, e.g., Ananny and Crawford, supra note 4; Adrian Weller, Challenges for
Transparency, CORNELL UNIV. (July 29, 2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.01870; Danielle
Citron, What to Do about the Emerging Threat of Censorship Creep on the Internet, CATO INST.
(November 28, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/what-do-aboutemerging-threat-censorship-creep-internet.
21
Namely Article 13(2)(f), Article 14(2)(g) and Article 15(1)(g). Regulation (EU) 2016/679
of the European Parliament and the Council of April 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
22
GDPR art. 22.
23
See discussion in Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the
Right to Explanation, 7 INT. DATA PRIV. L. 233 (2017) (showing the connection between
providing information and individuals enforcing their rights).
24
See discussion in Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence
Based Policy, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 50 (2015).
19
20
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must understand how that information relates to their particular
circumstances and preferences. Many years of research on the effect of
information disclosure, in multiple realms, demonstrate that there is a
significant gap between the promise of disclosures and their actual
impact. 25 The drive towards transparency often produces legal and policy
regimes that fail to achieve genuine accountability over time.
Accountability should be the central aim of all approaches to governing
decision-making using machine learning. The giving and receiving of
justifications is part of what it means for a citizenry to authorise in an
ongoing way the complex decision-making systems whose
recommendations shape their lives.
B. Explanation < Justification
We now turn to the central concept in the RtE debate, on which most
interpretations of the GDPR have focused: explanation. On the face of it, the
role of explanation in our notion of accountability seems obvious.
Accountability requires justification and justification requires explanation.
To justify a decision-making procedure that involves or is constituted by a
machine learning model, an individual subject to that decision-making
procedure requires an explanation of how the machine learning model
works. This is the thought that underpins much of the RtE debate.
But let’s pause for a moment to ask: What form of explanation does
justification require? Think of an example. Suppose you are involved in a
major car crash that leaves you paralyzed from the waist down. After you
wake up in hospital, you ask: Why did I crash? The crash investigator
helpfully left a report by the side of your bed. It explains: The velocity of
your car produced a centrifugal force on your wheel hub, which, gradually
produced a rotating motion on your wheel stud which, in turn, loosened your
front left wheel from your chassis. The resulting force made your vehicle
swerve to the left. The particles of the central barrier then came into contact
25
See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY (2007); Lauren Willis, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the
Quest for Consumer Comprehension, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 74 (2017); OMRI
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal
Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015); Matthew A. Edwards,
Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest
for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 229 (2004). For further analysis of
the ideology underlying calls for transparency, see David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological
Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018) (arguing that transparency has shifted from an idea that
promotes a stronger and more egalitarian regulatory state, to a tool aimed at limiting government
intervention and regulation).
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with the polymers on the left side of your vehicle. The molecular structure
of the polymer was broken on the driver’s side, rapidly reducing the speed
of your vehicle and eventually bringing it to a halt. This explanation is
clearly unsatisfactory. It’s an explanation at the wrong level. It answers your
‘why’ question with an account of microphysics. You want to know why
your wheel came off. The explanation might be true, but it is beside the
point. What you really want is for Ford to justify why your wheel came off
despite having serviced your vehicle last month. What matters is the
justification that is part of the process of accountability. The form of
explanation involved in that justification depends on the context. If Ford
sent you an account of the microphysics of your crash, you would consider
that not just a misunderstanding about the information you require, but an
evasion of accountability. It represents a failure to justify what happened.
The RtE debate often conceives of explanations at completely the wrong
level. More precisely, at a level that is simply not relevant to justification,
and therefore, to accountability. To those subject to the decisions of a
machine learning model, offering an explanation of a machine learning
model is a little like offering an account of microphysics to explain a car
crash. Explanations of machine learning models are certainly not sufficient
for many of the most important forms of justification in modern
democracies, and often, they may not even be necessary. More specifically,
what form of explanation is necessary, including whether a technical
explanation of the machine learning model is necessary, depends on who is
justifying what to whom. This implies two important shifts in focus. First,
in terms of what is being justified. The focus should be on how institutions
justify their choices about the design and integration of machine learning
models into their decision-making systems, rather than on what the rules
governing a model’s operation are. What matters is why the rules of an
algorithm are what they are. 26 Second, in terms of to whom the justification
is being offered. Institutions should justify their choices about the design
and integration of machine learning models not to individuals, but to
empowered regulators or other forms of public oversight bodies. Less
emphasis should be placed on the rights of disempowered and isolated
individuals, who are expected to understand the complicated models to
whose decisions they are subject, and more on systemic accountability – the
way power is structured between institutions. If accountability is the
foundational goal, what is required is institutional justification, not
algorithmic explanation. Algorithmic explanation can be necessary to
institutional justification. But since it is justification that is necessary for
accountability, and it is accountability that is of ultimate importance, the
26

Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3.
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form of institutional justification should determine the appropriate form of
explanation.
The excessive focus on technical forms of explanation is itself the result
of an uncritical bent towards transparency. This is partly the product of
history. Much of the policy and legal debate about the governance of
machine learning has developed from older debates about privacy. Many
scholars who were previously privacy experts now write about the
governance of artificial intelligence. The GDPR is framed as a privacy law,
even though its focus reaches far beyond the confines of privacy. 27 The
transparency bent, with all its pitfalls, has been unreflectively transposed
from the privacy literature to the literature on explanation and
interpretability. 28 The risk is that the limits of the transparency debate swiftly
become limits to the debate about how we should integrate machine learning
models into some of our most important social, economic and political
institutions. The most important limit is the focus on individual rights, rather
than on structures of power. The privacy debate has always been hemmed
in by its focus on individual consent, a concept that has proved to be a
mirage in theory and in practice.29 As a result, it has overlooked more
fundamental and intractable challenges about how institutions should hold
one another to account, most notably, involving questions about the
structure and distribution of power. If individual-understanding-ofmachine-learning-models becomes the new individual-consent-to-the-useof-their-data, we should expect a wholesale failure to hold to account the
institutions that use machine learning for their own ends.
This uncritical bent towards transparency, and the subsequent focus on
technical explanation, actually suits many of the most powerful actors in the
internet age. The focus on algorithmic explanation can deflect from the need
for institutional justification. Consider an example. To satisfy increasing
calls for oversight and accountability in content moderation, suppose
Facebook rolls out a new interactive tool. This tool allows individual users
to interact with their News Feed, to understand the factors that ‘explain’ why
they see particular pieces of content. Users would be able to change
important parameters about themselves, such as their gender, race, or
27
For instance, much of the literature about explanation in law is published in journals that
are putatively about privacy. See generally Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra
note 5.
28
See generally BRIN, supra note 7; Will Thomas Devries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital
Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 283–311 (2003); Joshua A. T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel,
Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 385–457 (2016).
29
Lothar Determann, Social Media Privacy: A Dozen Myths and Facts, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 7-10 (2012); Dan Svirsky, Why Are Privacy Preferences Inconsistent? 15 (JOHN M.
OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON., & BUS. FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, HARV. LAW SCH.,
Discussion Paper No. 81, 2018).
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location, but also their behaviour on Facebook, such as what groups they
have liked, or what publishers they read, and see how their News Feed
changes. No doubt many users would feel Facebook had discharged its
responsibility to explain how News Feed works. But this is not satisfactory.
To the question “Why do I see what I see?”, the tool effectively says “Well,
if you were African American and not white, you’d see this; if you were
female and not male, you’d see this; if you were from California and not
Wisconsin, you’d see this; if you had a lower proportion of photos that
contained cats, you’d see this”, and so on. By implication, it says: “You see
this because you are a white male from Wisconsin who likes cats.” That
explanation may be true. It may even enable a user to develop an intuitive
picture of how Facebook’s News Feed ranking systems work (though we
are sceptical even of that, since that intuitive picture applies only to their
case and may not generalize). 30 But it is nonetheless beside the point. The
individual wants to know why Facebook chose to construct its News Feed
ranking system in the way it did. Why are engagement and relevance the
primary metrics, and how are they defined? What are the other principles on
the basis of which content is promoted and demoted on News Feed? They
want Facebook to justify its News Feed ranking system. The kind of
explanation this requires is on the level of choices and principles in the
design of content moderation systems, not of interpretable machine learning
models. Such technical explanations can actually distract from the
appropriate form of justification. Citizens feel they no longer need to press
for answers to the harder, but more fundamental question: Why do you
distribute information in this way?
The posing of these questions by citizens, and the answering of them by
institutions, is essential to the functioning of modern democracies. For large
internet companies in particular, the drive towards transparency, cashed out
in the form of the search for interpretable machine learning models,
represents a welcome distraction from a fundamental debate about their own
powers and purposes. The danger is that we make the same mistake in
explanation and interpretability as we have in privacy: individual
‘understanding’ of a model takes the role ‘consent’ is supposed to play in
securing important forms of institutional accountability. Individual
understanding may often be just as much of an illusion as individual
consent. 31
30
Along the lines of the kind of interactive explanation systems about which Edwards and
Veale are more optimistic. See generally Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note
5.
31
See generally Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET (2013); Rikke Frank
Joergensen, The Unbearable Lightness of User Consent, 3 INTERNET POL'Y REV. (2014);
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Accountability is constitutive of democratic self-governance. It is part of
what it means for citizens to authorise in an ongoing way the complex
decision-making procedures to which they are subject. Accountability
requires that an institution justify its choices for the design and
implementation of its decision-making procedures, including the use of
statistical techniques and machine learning, to an individual or institution
with meaningful powers of oversight and enforcement. The right form of
explanation can be crucial to the giving and receiving of that justification.
The wrong form can unintentionally or intentionally undermine it. Technical
explanations of machine learning models can further the aim of institutional
justification, and therefore of accountability. But they can also undermine
and distract from it. The form of explanation should depend on the form of
accountability. Institutional context should drive the form of explanation
offered. We cannot simply adopt technical solutions to explanation without
thinking through what is required for genuine accountability over time. It is
to this challenge, and to the interpretation of the GDPR with this aim in
mind, that we now turn.
II. SYSTEMIC ACCOUNTABILITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE GDPR
We now turn to the GDPR and the RtE debate that has dominated its
reception amongst scholars in the U.S. The GDPR, which came into
effect in May 2018, lays down requirements with respect to the
information individuals must receive about automated decision-making
in their case. 32 Several recent proposals have followed suit, seeking to
ensure that machine learning models, which might otherwise be
uninterpretable, can be explained to those whose lives they will

Elizabeth Denham, Consent Is Not the ‘Silver Bullet’ for GDPR Compliance, INFO. COMM'R
OFF. NEWS BLOG (August 16, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blogconsent-is-not-the-silver-bullet-for-gdpr-compliance/.
32
See generally Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 1; Casey et al.,
Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra note 1; Isak Mendoza & Lee Bygrave, The Right Not
to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, EU INTERNET L.: REG. AND
ENFORCEMENT (2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on
Algorithmic Decision Making and a "Right to Explanation," 38 AI MAG. 50, 50–57 (2017);
Malgieri & Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 6; Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information
and the Right to Explanation, supra note 23; Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7
INT. DATA PRIV. L. 76, 76–99 (2017); Sandra Wachter et al., Counterfactual Explanations
without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
841 (2018).
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inevitably shape. 33 Broadly, the GDPR requires individuals to be
provided with “meaningful information about the logic involved” in the
automated decision 34 as part of the right to contest these decisions and
to enforce other rights under the GDPR. 35
There has been fierce disagreement about the scope and content of
this explainability requirement. The core of the right to explanation in
the GDPR regime can be found in Article 22 and Articles 13, 14, and 15.
Article 22 lays down the general assumption against “automated
individual decision-making, including profiling” and articulates the
three exceptions to that assumption, while Article 13, Article 14 and
Article 15 discuss the various transparency rights that arise from the use
of automated decision-making, including the right to explanation.
Article 13 creates requirements at the time information is collected from
an individual, Article 14 focuses on requirements at the time information
is collected from a third party, and Article 15 creates ongoing
requirements related to the holding of individuals’ information. These
Articles bear on cases of decisions “based solely on automated
processing” which “produce[s] legal effects concerning him or her or
similarly significantly affects him or her,” as they require the individual
to be informed of the existence of the automated decision-making and
for the provision of “meaningful information about the logic involved”
in the automated decision. 36
Our aim is not to offer another interpretation of this requirement. We
agree with scholars who have recently argued that the GDPR’s main text
must be read alongside surrounding ‘soft-law.’ 37 These include the
preamble to the Directive, known as the Recitals. These Recitals are not
strictly binding, but they indicate how the GDPR is likely to be enforced
and how, therefore, companies are likely to shape their behaviour to
comply with the GDPR. 38 They also include the guidance of the Article
33
See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017);
Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra note 5; Edwards & Veale, Slave to the
Algorithm, supra note 5.
34
See GDPR arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(g).
35
Selbst and Powles make explicit this connection between providing information and
individuals enforcing their rights. Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to
Explanation, supra note 23.
36
An individual also has the right to contest these decisions under Article 22. GDPR, supra
note 21.
37
See generally Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1; Kaminski, The Right to
Explanation, Explained, supra note 1; Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra
note 1.
38
As Kaminski puts it, “[t]hese texts are not technically binding, but they provide clarity of
what is to come.” Kaminski, supra note 1, at 195; In contrast, Wachter et al., who argue that the
Recitals are not binding in the case of establishing the right to explanation since they are only
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29 Working Party (A29WP), an advisory board made up of data
protection authority representatives of all EU Member States, the
European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission.
The purpose of the A29WP and its successor, the European Data
Protection Board, is to promote consistent application of the GDPR
across Member States. 39 Furthermore, the GDPR is designed to be given
force by national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), like many other
EU Directives. How those institutions interpret its provisions is, in the
end, what matters. We therefore give particular weight to guidance
subsequently issued by national DPAs, most notably, the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the U.K. 40
In our view, this accompanying guidance makes it clear that the
GDPR does contain a right to explanation. But more importantly, that
guidance should shape how we elaborate on the content and scope of
that right to explanation. The guidance suggests that the GDPR has
begun to develop a comprehensive set of provisions for attaining
systemic accountability over time. What a right to an explanation means
in the context of the GDPR should depend on how the GDPR aims to
secure systemic accountability.
Our aim is to approach the challenge of explainability by keeping in
mind what is of ultimate importance: holding those with power to
account, by ensuring that institutions justify their design and use of
machine learning models to regulatory bodies and to individuals subject
to their predictions, classifications, and rankings. The appropriate form
of explanation should depend on who is justifying what to whom, as part
of the process of accountability. To draw out the implications of this
argument for interpreting the GDPR, we propose a simple taxonomy of
justifications. It is broken down by three questions: (1) Who is offering

meant to provide guidance in cases of ambiguity, which is not the case, they argue, with respect
to Article 22. Moreover, they argue that the Recital could not be used to establish new legal
rights and duties that do not clearly exist in the text of the Directive. See Wachter, et al., supra
note 32, at 80.
39
GDPR replaced the pre-existing EU Directive on privacy, the Data Protection Directive,
which came into force in 1995, and was suspended when the GDPR became enforceable in 2018.
40
See generally ICO, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), U.K.
INFO. COMM'R OFF. (August 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-thegeneral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr-1-0.pdf; See also ICO, Rights Related to Automated
Decision Making Including Profiling, U.K. INFO. COMM'R OFF. (2017), https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-including-profiling/; see
also ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection, U.K. INFO.
COMM'R OFF. (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-dataai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf.
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the justification?; (2) What is being justified?; and (3) To whom is the
justification offered?
Who should offer the justification?
We leave this question to one side. It implies distinctions between
both between engineers who design the model and the institutions that
use it as part of their decision-making process, and between different
forms of institutions, such as private and public. We focus on the
justification of decision-making processes by private institutions.
What should be justified?
1. The machine learning model (overall logic or specific
predictions); OR
2. The choices an institution makes about the design of a machine
learning model and its integration into their decision-making
procedure.
To whom should the justification be offered?
A. An individual subject to the model’s predictions, classifications
or rankings; OR
B. A regulator or some other type of public oversight body.
We focus on two categories of justification that can be drawn from
this taxonomy. The first is 1A. The explanation of a machine learning
model (1) to an individual (A). The second is 2B. The explanation of the
choices an institution makes in the design and implementation of a
decision-making procedure (2) to a regulator or some other public
oversight body (B). Let’s take each in turn.
The debate about whether the GDPR contains a RtE focuses on the
1A category. It concerns whether an individual has a right to
“meaningful information about the logic involved” in a fully automated
decision which “significantly affects him or her.” 41 This has produced a
range of approaches to explaining machine learning models to
individuals that would satisfy this requirement, from straightforward
41

Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, supra note 23.
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counter-factual explanations 42 to more complex technical approaches to
developing interpretable models. These technical approaches aim to
summarise the logic of a complex machine learning model in a simpler,
more comprehensible model. Most explain how machine learning
models work after the fact, known as reverse engineering. These tend to
either summarise the whole logic of the model, known as global
approaches, or to explain a specific set of outcomes the model produces,
known as local approaches. 43
We believe this focus on the 1A category is mistaken. The 1A
category, the requirement that an institution explain how its machine
learning model works to an individual subject to those decisions, is not
a satisfactory way of holding institutions to account. Knowing what the
rules are is not itself a check on the power of those who decide what the
rules are. The category mistakenly characterises a challenge of
institutional justification as a challenge of algorithmic explanation.
Focusing on the requirement of those with power to inform subjects as
to what the rules are, intentionally or not, distracts from the higher-order
question of what the rules should be. If Facebook offers a tool that
allows an individual to understand why their News Feed shows them
what it does, the danger is that the user feels as though Facebook has
justified its more general choices about how it distributes information
on News Feed. It has in fact done nothing of the sort. It suits Facebook
for the debate to focus on how they can develop technical explanations
of News Feed’s ranking models, rather than on the principles Facebook
chooses to impose on its content moderation systems. The latter draws
attention to Facebook’s underlying power to decide who sees what, and
why.
Nor is the 1A category a satisfactory interpretation of the GDPR’s
most important provisions. The GDPR contains important mechanisms
for systemic accountability, which focus on forcing an institution to
See Wachter et al., supra note 32, at 854.
See generally Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box
Models, 51 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1, 1–42 (2018); Philip Adler et al., Auditing Black-Box
Models for Indirect Influence, 54 KNOWLEDGE AND INFO. SYS. 95, 95–122 (2018); Selbst and
Barocas supra note 3; Zachary Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, CORNELL UNIV.
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03490; Kroll et al., supra note 33; Jatinder Singh et al.,
Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process (Working Paper, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2860048; Marco T. Ribeiro et al., Why Should I Trust You?:
Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, 22 ACM 1135, 1135–1144 (2016); Tameru
Hailesilassie, Rule Extraction Algorithm for Deep Neural Networks: A Review, 14 INT'L J.
COMP. SCI. & INFO. SEC. 376, 376–380 (2016); Anupam Datta et al. Algorithmic Transparency
via Quantitative Input Influence: Theory and Experiments with Learning Systems, 37
IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIV. 598, 598–617 (2016).
42
43
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justify their choices in the design and implementation of algorithmic
decision-making systems, including their broader policy and
commercial aims. Read in conjunction with the accompanying guidance
of the Recitals, and the guidance published by A29WP and the ICO, the
GDPR contains provisions that have the potential to transform the exante process of designing machine learning models and integrating them
into the decision-making systems of a range of important institutions. It
sets out clear mechanisms for structuring systemic accountability, to
ensure institutions justify the choices they make in that process. These
include empowered DPAs, broad Data Protection Impact Assessments
(DPIAs), auditing, and ethical review boards. 44
This section uses our taxonomy of justifications to explore what this
broader, more expansive reading of the GDPR implies for various forms
of explanation. We contrast our 1A and 2B categories—the explanation
of a machine learning model to an individual and the explanation of the
decisions made in the design and implementation of that model to a
regulator—to explore what is wrong with the more limited readings of
the GDPR’s provisions. The aim is to learn some broader lessons about
the governance of institutions designing decision-making systems that
use machine learning.
A. What Should Be Justified: Institutions and the Process of Machine
Learning
We first focus on what it is that should be justified in the process of
securing systemic accountability in the governance of algorithmic
decision-making. If it is the machine learning model itself that must be
justified, it would seem to follow that such a justification depends on an
explanation of how the model works, either in terms of its overall logic or
some subset of specific predictions.
This reasoning is mistaken, but it is encouraged by the text of the
GDPR itself. Article 22 focuses on decisions “based solely” on automated
data processing. The question of what exactly this means has divided
scholars. Some have argued that decision-making procedures which
involve humans in some perfunctory way would be exempt from Article

44
See Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 208 ("Accompanied
by other company duties in the GDPR—including establishing data protection officers, using
data protection impact assessments, and following the principles of data protection by design—
this regime, if enforced, has the potential to be a sea change in how algorithmic decision-making
is regulated in the EU.").
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22’s requirements. 45 Much more persuasively, others argue that human
involvement must be meaningful, as the A29WP guidance states,
involving a person who has the “authority and competence to change the
decision.” 46 Article 22 in fact creates a strong presumption, or even
prohibition, against solely automated decision-making, subject to three
exceptions. 47 The GDPR intends to target decision-making systems that
are fully automated, those which are, for instance, wholly constituted by a
machine learning model. The right to explanation applies to these cases
only. 48
Articles 13, 14, and 15 then require that the data controller provide
information about “the logic involved” in the automated decision-making.
Here again, the language of the text itself is ambiguous. It is likely that
this involves a requirement to explain the logic of the whole machine
learning model rather than a subset of the predictions it produces. 49 If so,
the GDPR is broader than other legal requirements to explain automated
decisions, such as the requirement in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) that an applicant be provided a “statement of specific reasons for
the action taken.” 50 The ECOA requirement focuses on the individual
outcome only, while the GDPR arguably requires a broader form of
explanation.
This would seem to produce a view of the resulting right to explanation
that falls squarely within the 1A category. The GDPR, on this view,
requires an explanation of the logic of an entire machine learning model,
45
See Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making
Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 32, at 88 ("Quite
crucially, this creates a loophole whereby even nominal involvement of a human in the decisionmaking process allows for an otherwise automated mechanism to avoid invoking elements of
the right of access.").
46
See Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra note 1, at 171 ("According to
the A29WP, companies must ensure that any human 'oversight of [a] decision is meaningful,
rather than just a token gesture' if they intend for their systems to fall outside the scope of Article
22’s provisions pertaining to decisions 'based solely on automated processing.'").
47
These exceptions are: consent, contract, or if authorised by Union or member state law.
See Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 197-198 (describing the
three exceptions to the Article 22 right and prohibition); Isak Mendoza and Lee A. Bygrave, The
Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling 14 (U. OSLO FAC. L. LEGAL
STUDIES, Research Paper No. 2017-20, 2017) (providing the exceptions to the Article 22 right).
48
“Interpreting Article 22 as a prohibition rather than a right to be invoked means that
individuals are automatically protected from the potential effects this type of processing may
have.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual
Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (Feb. 6, 2018), at 20
[hereinafter A29WP]. Also note that, according to the Guidelines, the exceptions in Article 22
should be interpreted narrowly. Id. at 13.
49
See Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, supra note
23, at 236.
50
12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(a)(2)(i).
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where that model constitutes the whole decision-making procedure that
results in legal or similarly significant effects on a data subject.
This is not only a limited reading of the provisions and intent of the
GDPR, it also completely misunderstands the role that explanation should
play in a broader system for structuring accountability in the governance
of algorithmic decision-making. Machine learning is a way of establishing
a decision-making procedure. It is best thought of as a process, one that
involves choices at every stage. These choices are made by institutions
who design and integrate machine learning models into their decisionmaking procedures. These choices profoundly shape the form the machine
learning model takes, the role it plays in their decision-making procedures,
and the effects those decisions have on individuals over time. We believe
that the RtE should be read in the context of the GDPR’s broader
provisions for mechanisms to secure accountability over time. These focus
on the ex-ante design and implementation of decision-making procedures
using machine learning. 51
There are three crucial choices in the process of machine learning itself
that must be considered, along with a broader set of choices about the role
the machine learning model plays in the decision-making procedure, and
the policy or commercial aims the institution has in deploying it.
1.

Outcome of Interest

First, the outcome of interest is what the machine learning model looks
for, that is, what it predicts, ranks, or classifies. The selection of an
outcome of interest very often embeds important moral and political
choices, which profoundly shape the predictions, classifications, or
rankings the model will produce. 52 This choice, and the reasons for making
it, require justification.
2.

Training Data

Second, the training data set is what the machine learning models from.
Recent research has developed several technical approaches to the
evaluation of fairness in training data. 53 There are multiple aspects to the
selection and construction of a training dataset, all of which can be
See infra note 52.
See generally Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L. J. 1147 (2017).
53
See generally Rich Zemel et al., Learning Fair Representations, 2013 INT'L CONF. MACH.
LEARNING 325 (2013); J. Henry Hinnefeld et al., Evaluating Fairness Metrics in the Presence
of Dataset Bias, CORNELL UNIV. (Sept. 24, 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1809.09245.
51
52
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extremely important in shaping the predictions of the resulting machine
learning model. These range from choices about time periods,
demographic representativeness, and how to label the data.
3.

Features

Third, the features included in a machine learning model. This includes
choices about whether to include or exclude protected traits, such as race
and gender. Removing a protected trait from a model is neither necessary
nor sufficient to prevent discrimination in machine learning. In fact,
preventing discrimination may require that information about individual
membership of protected groups be included in machine learning models;
fairness might require awareness, not blindness. 54 It also includes choices
about whether to simplify the model by reducing the number of
variables. 55
Accountability requires justification. The form of explanation that
justification requires depends on who is justifying what to whom. The
GDPR is concerned with holding to account institutions which use
automated decision-making procedures in important spheres. 56 Technical
explanations of the logic of a machine learning model to an isolated
individual will not be conducive to the kind of ongoing accountability the
GDPR requires. The very form a machine learning model takes depends
on choices made by humans in its design and implementation. The notion
of providing a technical explanation of a machine learning model
completely obscures the important and prior question: How did the rules
that govern the operation of the automated decision come to be what they
are? That is a question about the justification of institutional choices which
is both prior to and much more significant than the question of what the
54
See generally Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness through Awareness, 2012 PROC.
INNOVATIONS. IN THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. 214 (2012); Talia B. Gillis and Jann L. Spiess,
Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 471 (2019); Symposium, Nina Grgic Hlaca et al., The Case for Process Fairness in Learning: Feature Selection for Fair Decision
Making, 29 CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. (2016).
55
Veale et al. describe a case in which the performance target of 75 percent was specified
in advance, so the number of features could be reduced from 18,000 to 200, then 20, then 8,
“because it’s important to see how it works, we believe.” Michael Veale, Max Van Kleek, and
Reuben Binns, Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic Support in HighStakes Public Sector Decision-Making 440, PROC. OF THE 2018 CHI. CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS
IN COMP. SYS. (2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01029.
56
For instance, the ‘spheres’ in which DPIAs might be required are described as ‘high-risk’
in the text. The A29WP guidance lists a set of concrete criteria that make clear the broad scope
of what ‘high-risk’ might mean. See Casey et al., supra note 1, at 176 ("Article 35(7) of the
GDPR enumerates four basic features that all DPIAs must, at a minimum, contain."); A29WP,
supra note 48.
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rules are. It is also, we have argued, a question to which the GDPR’s
provisions aim to elicit an answer.
This is precisely what the A29WP guidance states. The guidance
explains that “the complexity of machine-learning” algorithms “can make
it challenging to understand how an automated decision-making process
or profiling works.” 57 Such complexity, the guidance continues, “is no
excuse for failing to provide information.” 58 Companies whose decisions
are subject to the provisions of Article 22 “should find simple ways to tell
the data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in
reaching the decision,” “not necessarily a complex explanation of the
algorithms used or [a] disclosure of the full algorithm.” 59 The guidance
further clarifies that this will include information used in the decisionmaking process, including: categories of data; the source of that
information; how many profiles were constructed and used in the
procedure; and how that profile is used for a decision about the data
subject. 60
Institutions always make choices about how to design and integrate
machine learning models into their decision-making procedures. In these
choices lie trade-offs about discrimination and fairness, who wins and who
loses, along with a host of other normative and epistemological
assumptions. It is for these choices that an institution must be held
accountable. The GDPR’s provisions for a RtE must be understood in this
context. Surrounding guidance makes clear that the appropriate form of
explanation is not specifically about the logic of the machine learning
model, but the choices an institution made in designing and integrating it
into their decision-making system. 61
B. To Whom Should the Justification Be Offered: Regulators and
Citizens
There is also confusion about to whom the justification is owed. Here
again, the language of the GDPR is not helpful. The GDPR text itself does
not explain the aims of a RtE. However, the guidelines explain that “the
data subject will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view
Id. at 25.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 31.
61
For a useful overview of the kinds of choices that might be required for the form of
justification at which the GDPR aims, which they term ‘legibility,’ See generally Gianclaudio
Malgieri and Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making
Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 6.
57
58
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if they fully understand how it has been made and on what basis.” 62 The
emphasis on the ability to challenge the decision reflects the fact that on
this view, the purpose of the explanation is to invoke a data subject’s other
fundamental rights. As Kaminski puts it, “[i]ndividual transparency
provisions, as the guidelines make clear, are intended to empower
individuals to invoke their rights under the GDPR.” 63
We think this is a problem not with scholarly interpretations of the
GDPR, but with the reasoning of the text itself and the guidelines
surrounding it. The idea that the disclosure of information produces the
enforcement of rights is not supported by evidence. Other areas of
consumer behaviour research suggest people often struggle understanding
straightforward information about products and how they pertain to their
personal information. 64 The GDPR’s instrumental individual transparency
approach goes one step further, assuming that individuals will not only
understand the information they are provided, but also that they will
recognize violations of their legal rights and act on them. 65 Furthermore,
many of the fundamental concerns about using machine learning to make
decisions – most notably those related to bias and discrimination – can
only be understood with a systematic and aggregate analysis of the
decision-making procedure. The explanation of an individual decision to
an isolated individual will not enable this kind of aggregate analysis; in
fact, it may even obscure demands for obtaining it. The GDPR’s account
of the instrumental aim of an individual RtE is not convincing.
If systemic accountability is placed front and centre, rather than
individual rights, it is clear that institutional justification of decisionmaking procedures must be offered to empowered, well-resourced
regulators. There are ample provisions in the GDPR for doing just this.
The individual RtE should not distract or detract from these provisions for
systemic accountability. Rather, as we have consistently argued, the RtE
should be viewed as a means to this broader end.
A focus on systemic accountability produces a very different view of
the kind of explanations a regulator might require from an institution. We
believe that at minimum, an explanation that supports the form of
justification required by systemic accountability would answer the
following questions. In all cases, the institution must not only provide a
satisfactory answer to the question, it must provide reasons for the answers
A29WP, supra note 48, at 27.
Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 211.
64
See supra note 24. See also Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis, (Mis)perceptions of Law in
Consumer Markets, AM. L. & ECON. REV. (2017) (discussing misperceptions of the law, which
is an additional reason that disclosures alone may be insufficient).
65
See Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra note 5, at 52.
62
63
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given. Where relevant, answers could be accompanied by quantitative data
and analysis.
1.

What are the goals of the decision-making procedure?

2. What are the company policies that constrain or inform the
decision-making procedure, including the role machine learning
plays within it?
3. How did the company define the outcome of interest the machine
learning model was trained to predict? Why?
4. How did the company select and construct the data on which the
model was trained? If relevant, how was the data labelled and by
whom? Was the impact of using other training data considered?
5. What features did the company choose to include or excluded in
the model? Why?
6. Does the decision-making procedure involve human discretion?
How precisely do the automated and human element of the
decision-making procedure interact? Has the company considered
how this interaction effects aggregate outcomes?
7. Has the lender considered how this interaction affects
decisions? 66
The GDPR has ample mechanisms for encouraging, if not requiring,
companies to answer these questions. As Kaminski argues, rather than
“arguing over” the “instrumental value of individual notice, or publicly
releasing source code,” we should be debating how to obtain structured
“accountability across a firm’s decision-making, over time.” 67
Consider Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs). 68 DPIA’s are
a “process for building and demonstrating” compliance by systematically
66
For an alternative and insightful list of questions, see generally Malgieri and Comandé,
supra note 6, at 29-30.
67
Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 35.
68
There are others mechanisms in the GDPR for attaining systemic accountability, such as
auditing and ethical review boards. See e.g. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 8
("The instrumental rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making counsels that regulation
should try to correct these problems, often by using systemic accountability mechanisms, such
as ex ante technical requirements, audits, or oversight boards, to do so."); Kroll et al., supra note
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examining how automated decision-making procedures are designed and
implemented. They are meant to be an “iterative process” that fall within
the GDPR’s broader “data protection by design” principles, which apply
throughout the design, implementation and monitoring of a decisionmaking procedure. 69 DPIAs are more than simple recommendations of
best practice. They are intended to apply to a broad range of institutions
which use data to make important decisions. Importantly, those decisions
must not be solely automated. As the A29WP guidance states, DPIAs
apply “in the case of decision-making including profiling with legal or
similarly significant effects that is not wholly automated, as well as solely
automated decision-making defined in Article 22(1).” 70 Where appropriate,
companies should “seek the views of data subjects or their representatives”
during the DPIA process. 71 And companies should explain their reasons
for making the choices they did in the design and implementation of their
models.
In this context, the scope and content of the RtE is much broader. As
Casey et al. argue, the right to explanation “is no mere remedial
mechanism to be invoked by data subjects on an individual basis, but
implies a more general form of oversight with broad implications for the
design, prototyping, field testing, and deployment of data processing
systems.” 72 We agree with Veale and Edwards that ex ante DPIAs will
“become the required norm for algorithmic systems, especially where
sensitive personal data, such as race or political opinion is processed on a
large scale.” 73
This is as it should be. The form of explanation required for
institutional justification will often not be the technical explanation of the
logic of machine learning models to isolated individuals. This is the 1A
33, at 660 ("Beyond transparency, auditing is another strategy for verifying how a computer
system works."); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 1133 ("The most common trigger of the
latter is a lawsuit, in which documents can be obtained and scrutinized and witnesses can be
deposed or examined on the stand, but auditing requirements are another possibility.").
69
See Casey et al. supra note 1, at 172-173; A29WP, supra note 48, at 29 (“As a key
accountability tool, a DPIA enables the controller to assess the risks involved in automated
decision-making, including profiling. It is a way of showing that suitable measures have been
put in place to address those risks and demonstrate compliance with the GDPR.”).
70
Id. at 32 ("The following list, though not exhaustive, provides some good practice
suggestions for controllers to consider when making solely automated decisions . . . ."). See also
Casey et al., supra note 1, at 174 (According to the Regulation, DPIAs are mandatory '[w]here
a type of processing[,] taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the
processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.'")
(internal citations omitted).
71
Id. at 36.
72
Id. at 39.
73
Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm?, supra note 5, at 78.
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category. Rather, it should be an explanation of the decisions an institution
made in the design of a machine learning model and its integration into
their decision-making procedure, to an empowered regulator. This is the
2B category. Reporting to a regulator rather than to an individual is
necessary to reveal aggregate patterns and effects that are not discoverable
when considering a decision in isolation. 74 Regulators and other public
bodies have the technical knowledge, skills and time to evaluate
information that an individual does not. 75 The very purpose of regulators
is to take actions in situations when it is individually not worthwhile, but
is socially desirable.
CONCLUSION
The RtE debate should begin with the foundational goal:
accountability. Accountability is constitutive of democratic selfgovernance. It is an integral aspect of a citizenry’s ongoing authorization
of the complex decision-making systems which shape their lives. Part of
what it means to be a citizen of a self-governing polity is to give and
receive justifications of those decision-making systems. Explanations are
74
One of us has written about this type of aggregate analysis elsewhere when considering
the type of information a lender would provide to the CFPB to allow testing of whether credit
pricing algorithms are compliant with discrimination law. See generally Talia B. Gillis & Jann
L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019). In the context of credit
pricing discrimination, this has been one of the most significant barriers to a successful
discrimination complaint. The passing of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975, increased
the ability to bring a successful discrimination claim and class action against lender since the
Act mandated the disclosure of mortgage applications and their outcomes, allowing for an
aggregate consideration of mortgage decisions. See e.g. Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin
Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing Cases after Inclusive Communities, 19
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 685, 713-15 (2016).
75
Future technical research into explainability and interpretability in machine learning
could benefit from assuming that the appropriate audience for their approaches is not isolated
individuals but regulators. The great strength of Dwork’s ‘individual fairness’ approach is that
it isolates the normative choices and therefore makes possible a form of accountability, e.g. fair
affirmative action, through the choice of the distance metric. It can require access to protected
status information during the design phase, usually explicitly prohibited, which may require a
big shift in policy. What matters though is a procedure which justifies the choice of the distance
metric, which can be explained to either a regulator or, in some cases, those who are actually
subject to the decision. See Dwork et al., supra note 54, at 2 (describing the "[c]onnection
between individual fairness and group fairness," Dwork et al. state that "[s]tatistical parity is the
property that the demographics of those receiving positive (or negative) classifications are
identical to the demographics of the population as a whole. Statistical parity speaks to group
fairness rather than individual fairness, and appears desirable, as it equalizes outcomes across
protected and non-protected groups."); see also id. at 3 (“Justifying the availability of or access
to the distance metric in various settings is one of the most challenging aspects of our framework,
and in reality the metric used will most likely only be society’s current best approximation to
the truth.”).
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valuable insofar as they are required to achieve systemic accountability
over time. In practice, this means that the appropriate form of explanation
will depend on who is justifying what to whom. We have argued that the
RtE debate focuses far too much on the explanation of the logic of a
machine learning model to isolated individuals. What matters for
accountability is the justification by an institution of the choices it made
in the design and implementation of a machine learning model. The form
of systemic accountability should drive the form of institutional
justification, which in turn, should drive the appropriate form of
explanation.
Interpreting the GDPR matters because it is likely to shape future
regulation of algorithmic decision-making. The primary concerns that
arise when using machine learning to make, or assist with, important
decisions are not satisfactorily addressed by focusing on the rights of
isolated individuals, or the logic of an individual machine learning model
itself. As we develop comprehensive governance structures to address the
concerns that arise from the use of machine learning in decision-making,
we should move beyond frameworks that rely on the individual
enforcement of rights, and towards those which develop a systemic
approach to establishing and maintaining accountability within a complex
modern democracy.
This means moving beyond privacy as a lens through which to view
the governance of algorithmic decision-making. Some of the limited ways
in which the GDPR has been interpreted have been transplanted from older
debates about privacy. This is partly because the GDPR itself grew out of
earlier privacy provisions and it is partly because scholars who interpret it
often cut their cloth in the privacy field. The focus on individual rights, as
well as the notice and consent framework that underpins the GDPR’s
approach, are all characteristic of approaches to addressing concerns about
privacy. As Kaminski puts it, “the strong system of individual rights”
within the GDPR may come “at the cost of correcting systemic problems
essential for achieving accountability in modern democracies.” 76 If the
RtE is interpreted as requiring explanations of the logic of machine
learning models to isolated individuals, these explanations are not likely
to be useful to regulators in evaluating whether to accept the justification
of an institution of its decision-making procedure. That is, such
76
Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 74. This also means relating current
discussions about the governance of algorithmic decision-making to a rich literature on
regulatory strategies in an administrative state. See e.g. id. at 30-31 (“If there is already concern
in administrative law over insulating government bureaucrats from electoral and judicial
oversight, collaborative governance compounds such concerns by involving private parties.”)
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explanations may actually obstruct systemic accountability. Most
challenging of all, the GDPR requires companies to assist in the
enforcement of citizens’ fundamental rights. This effectively privatizes the
protection of individual rights. The GDPR and the literature surrounding
it has no satisfactory account of how its provisions are to be subject to
democratic oversight. Accountability matters because it is constitutive of
collective self-government. Future regulatory provisions must focus more
directly on developing mechanisms within modern democracies that can
secure accountability in the governance of algorithmic decision-making
systems.
We are currently in a moment of choice. We are choosing how to
integrate humanity’s most powerful decision-making tool – machine
learning – into a range of complex human activities. We have argued that
institutional justification, not algorithmic explanation, is essential to the
accountability constitutive of democratic self-government. The technical
explanation of machine learning models is never sufficient, is often not
necessary, and sometimes actively distracts from, the justification of the
decision-making systems of which they are a part. We must think through
what it means to reason about the justifications an institution should offer
for its choices in how and why it constructed its decision-making
procedure in the way it did – that is, a justification of why the rules are
what they are. We have offered a sketch of what such a system of reasoning
might look like.
We must keep our eyes on the right prize. That prize is accountability.
Institutional power is held in check by other institutions with the authority
and resources sufficient to hold them to account. To attain that prize
requires a laser-like focus on choice in the face of apparent technical
inevitability. In this case, it means requiring institutions to justify their
choices about how they have constructed their decision-making systems.
Not being distracted by whizzy technical explanations of their machine
learning models work – or even, of that most dangerous of terms, artificial
intelligence.

